Immigration Federalism: The Constitutional Battle Over Who Controls Immigration Enforcement
By Olivia Chen
The U.S. Constitution grants the federal government broad power over immigration, including the ability to regulate naturalization, control borders, and determine who may enter and remain in the United States, making immigration one of the clearest areas of federal authority. Yet in recent years, immigration enforcement has also become the center of one of the largest federalism battles in modern constitutional law. As administrations have changed, states and local governments have increasingly influenced immigration policy through sanctuary laws, cooperation agreements with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), restrictions on local police involvement, and lawsuits challenging federal enforcement efforts. At the same time, the federal government has responded by filing lawsuits against states and municipalities that it argues are obstructing federal immigration priorities. What began as a debate over enforcement strategy has evolved into a broader constitutional dispute over the balance of power between Washington and state governments.
Immigration federalism describes the relationship between the federal government’s constitutional authority over immigration and the ability of states and local governments to regulate issues affecting their communities. Although immigration laws are primarily created and enforced at the federal level because the Constitution provides the federal government with significant immigration authority, their enforcement often depends on state and local cooperation. Through federal preemption, courts have often held that states cannot create their own immigration systems that interfere with federal objectives. At the same time, states still retain broad authority under their traditional police powers to regulate public safety, criminal law, employment, licensing, and government services. When these powers intersect with immigration enforcement, questions arise over where state authority ends and federal authority begins. A central principle in these disputes is the anti-commandeering doctrine. Under Supreme Court precedent, the federal government generally cannot force states to administer or enforce federal regulatory programs. Cases such as New York v. United States, Printz v. United States, and Murphy v. NCAA established that while the federal government may enforce its own laws, it cannot require state officials to carry out federal responsibilities. Accordingly, this doctrine has become the foundation of many sanctuary policies, with states arguing that refusing to assist federal immigration enforcement is a constitutional exercise of state sovereignty rather than an effort to interfere with federal enforcement.
Throughout the years, Supreme Court precedent has shaped the modern debate over immigration enforcement and state power. In Hines v. Davidowitz (1941), the Court emphasized the federal government’s dominant role in immigration regulation, holding that states cannot create conflicting immigration systems that interfere with federal objectives. Later on, in the case Arizona v. United States (2012), Arizona Senate Bill 1070, officially called the Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, was supported, which attempted to expand state involvement and support for federal immigration enforcement in targeting illegal immigration by allowing actions like warrantless arrests. The Supreme Court struck down several provisions, ruling that immigration enforcement is primarily a federal responsibility. However, the Court allowed certain state enforcement provisions to remain, demonstrating that states are not completely excluded from immigration-related policymaking. Other cases have addressed the relationship between state authority and immigrant rights, such as Plyler v. Doe (1982), limiting state authority by ruling that states could not deny public education to children based on immigration status and Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting (2011) recognizing that some state regulations affecting immigrants, particularly employment verification laws, could survive federal preemption challenges.
As the landscape changed, sanctuary policies emerged. While the term “sanctuary jurisdiction” has no single legal definition, it generally refers to state and local policies limiting cooperation between local officials and federal immigration authorities. In our present context, this could refer to policies refusing ICE detainers, restricting information sharing beyond federal requirements, limiting the creation of agreements between ICE and state or local agencies to allow designated local officers to perform specific immigration enforcement functions under federal supervision and training, also known as 287(g) agreements, prohibiting local officers from questioning immigration status, and restricting use of local resources for federal immigration enforcement. Supporters argue these policies protect community trust and allow local police to focus on traditional public safety responsibilities. Opponents argue sanctuary policies interfere with federal enforcement and create obstacles to carrying out immigration laws.
Recently, federal lawsuits against states and cities have emerged as significant conflicts. In Chicago, Illinois, the Department of Justice has challenged policies like Illinois' Trust Act and Chicago’s Welcoming City Ordinance that limit local cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, arguing that these policies obstruct federal immigration priorities. However, the lawsuit was dismissed after a court determined that the federal government lacked standing to bring the challenge. In New York, state laws restricting immigration cooperation and regulating mask restrictions for ICE agents have also faced federal constitutional challenges, as recent litigation blocked certain limitations such as restrictions on mask wearing while allowing other policies like restrictions on future 287(g) agreements to remain in place. Massachusetts, Minnesota, and other states like Washington, Oregon, and Maine, have all faced other ongoing disputes regarding policies restricting ICE’s power and reach. On the broader scale, all of these represent major federalism arguments over state sovereignty and federal power.
Interestingly, states have also challenged federal immigration actions through lawsuits, specifically targeting DHS grant conditions, FEMA funding conditions, immigration enforcement, and executive orders. These lawsuits often rely on arguments involving the Administrative Procedure Act, the Spending Clause, the Tenth Amendment, and claims of unconstitutional federal coercion. States are primarily arguing that the federal government cannot use funding conditions or administrative authority to force states into supporting federal immigration policies. For example, in May 2025, New York led a multi-state coalition of 19 other states in filing federal lawsuits contesting directives tying disaster preparedness and transportation funds to immigration compliance. They argued that executive conditioning of funds violated the separation of powers, and seized congressional spending authority.
The growing number of immigration federalism lawsuits reflects several unresolved constitutional questions. Can the federal government require states to cooperate with immigration enforcement? Can states refuse ICE detainers? How far can Congress go when attaching conditions to federal funding? When does state immigration-related legislation become unconstitutional interference with federal authority?
The federal government argues that national immigration enforcement requires uniformity, and that without cooperation from states and local governments, immigration laws become inconsistent and difficult to enforce. Supporters of federal authority emphasize national security, border enforcement, and the need to prevent obstruction of federal law. On the other hand, states and local governments argue that federal immigration enforcement cannot override constitutional limits on federal power. They emphasize local autonomy, community trust, efficient policing, and protection of civil liberties. From their perspective, requiring local officials to enforce federal immigration laws would violate the anti-commandeering principle.
The outcome of these battles will have consequences far beyond immigration policy. Employers, police departments, county governments, and local agencies will face increased compliance obligations, legal uncertainty, and potential financial costs. Federal grants, law enforcement partnerships, and state policymaking authority may all be affected. Ultimately, immigration federalism represents a larger constitutional debate about the structure of the American government itself. As federal and state governments continue to pursue competing visions of immigration enforcement, courts will determine the boundaries between national authority and state sovereignty.
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